Far right in Croatia

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Graffiti on a wall in Croatia in 2006, which says "We'll give everything, but won't give Bobetko!", as well as the logo of the Ustaše and the acronym for the Independent State of Croatia.

Far-right politics in Croatia (Croatian: Krajnje desna politika) refers to any manifestation of far-right politics in Croatia. Individuals and groups in Croatia that employ far-right politics are most often associated with the historical Ustaše movement, hence they have connections to Neo-Nazism and neo-fascism. That World War II political movement was an extremist organization at the time supported by the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists. The association with the Ustaše has been called "Neo-Ustashism" by Slavko Goldstein.[1]

The common perception is that the far right includes people who were either involved with the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II; sympathizers; and people who utilise their symbolism. The far right mainly arose from a combination of the residual hatred from the Yugoslav wars and Croatian nationalism. Pro-Ustaša symbols and actions have been restricted by law in Croatia since 2003. The most common venue for expressing these beliefs is graffiti.

Background

The Ustaše was a Croatian right-wing ultranationalist movement founded in 1929 by Ante Pavelić.[2] The Ustaše lacked broad support in Croatia due to its radical and violent nature.[3] When Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, a German puppet-state, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was established and ruled by Pavelić and the Ustaše. During the Second World War, the Ustaše conducted genocide against Serbs, Roma and Jews within their borders.[4] Several far-right political parties in Croatia trace their roots to Ante Starčević and view the NDH as a legitimate foundational state.[5] Most openly declare their affiliation with the Ustaše.[6] Across the right-wing spectrum, various common themes emerge with varying degrees of which include the desire for a Greater Croatia, a negative stance towards the ICTY, anti-Serbianism, positive view of the NDH and negative attitudes towards NATO and the European Union.[7]

Za dom spremni ("Ready for the Homeland") was the WWII fascist salute used by the Ustaše and is considered to be the equivalent of the Nazi German Sieg heil.[8] Since Croatia's independence, the salute has become "re-popularized" through public discourse by the right-wing.[9]

Early independent political scene

Members of the Croatian Defence Forces, the paramilitary arm of the Croatian Party of Rights

The introduction of the freedom of speech enabled public expression of far-right politics.[10] Croatia has been accused of ignoring the crimes committed by the World War II-era fascist Ustaša regime, and of tolerating the symbols and the activities of individuals sympathetic to that regime. This has led to criticism of Croatia, particularly among Serbs, exacerbated with war-time propaganda for the Yugoslav Wars.[11] The antagonism between the Croats and the Serbs grew, and had become widespread by the time the Croatian War of Independence had started.[11] The Croatian-Serbian animosity during the Yugoslav wars was viewed by some as a rivalry between the "Ustaša" and the "Chetnik", even if both of these World War II-era organizations did not actually exist at the time.[11]

Among the organizations formed during wartime which were most commonly associated with neo-Ustashism was the Croatian Defence Forces (Hrvatske obrambene snage, HOS), which emerged as the de facto paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of Rights. Their symbols included dressing in black, at the time widely perceived to be reminiscent of blackshirts, and using the phrase Za dom spremni.[12]

Defacement of monuments

From 1991 until 2010, around 3,000 monuments erected in honour of the Partisans[13][14] have been damaged or destroyed throughout the country with little government response.[15] Furthermore, the devastation of World War II partisan monuments also often extended to those erected in honor of civilian victims of war, also with little or no intervention from the police. The defacements occurred during a period when communist parties lost power in much of Eastern Europe.[16][17]

Political parties

Active

Miroslav Škoro, the founder and first leader of the Homeland Movement

The coalition led by the Homeland Movement came third at the 2020 parliamentary election, winning 10.89% of the vote and 16 seats.[27][28] The abortion debate was one of the leading topics during political debates, while the Homeland Movement advocated a ban on abortion.[29]

Defunct

  • The Croatian Democratic Party of Rights (HDSP), extreme-right or neo-fascist,[21] founded by Krešimir Pavelić that was active during the 1990s.[18][30]
  • The National Democratic League (NDL), extreme-right or neo-fascist,[21] led by Ivan Vekić.[30]
  • Croatian Block (HB), extreme-right and militant, founded in 2004[7][31] and disbanded in 2009.

Post-war political scene

WWII genocide denial

Remembrance ceremonies at the site of Jasenovac concentration camp resumed, with support from the highest levels of government, including the right-wing HDZ under Ivo Sanader.[32] The conservative parties such as the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) permeated in their support for extreme forms of nationalism and far-right ideas.[33] Croatia's far-right often advocates the false theory that Jasenovac was a "labour camp" where mass murder did not take place.[34] The ideas promoted by its members have been amplified by mainstream media interviews and book tours.[35]

Parties like the Croatian Party of Rights which are most commonly associated with Ustašism generally aren't able to attract support from more than a few percent of the population (HSP coalition won 6.4% of the national popular vote in the 2003 election and 3.5% in the 2007 election). The HSP's image of "pro-Ustaša" was repetitively shunned by its leaders in an attempt to sway more votes.[36] The Croatian Pure Party of Rights openly praises the Ustaše regime, though the party does not meet the minimum number of votes needed to enter Parliament.[37]

On 11 July 2003 the Ivica Račan coalition government passed amendments to the penal code which outlawed hate speech.[38] The law has not perfectly applied.[39][40][41]

Graffiti

The conflation of modern and obsolete nationalist themes sometimes produces bizarre inconsistencies, as shown at picture on the right: at the time when the ICTY wanted Croatian general Janko Bobetko, the right-wing part of the public was adamant in its demands to prevent that, and some extremist painted graffiti saying so, together with neo-fascist symbols. At the same time, Bobetko was quite clearly not a neo-fascist himself, because his family was killed by the Ustaše,[42] and he fought against them.

Names of squares and streets

A square in the central part of Zagreb had been named the "Square of the victims of fascism" (Trg žrtava fašizma) because during World War II, over sixteen thousand people had been deported via the square to concentration camps.[43] In the early 1990s, this square was renamed to "Square of great Croats" (Trg hrvatskih velikana).[43] This decision was later walked back in December 2000 during Milan Bandić's mayoralty of Zagreb.[43]

In several Croatian cities, streets were renamed after Mile Budak, a prominent Ustaša ideologist, on the basis that he was otherwise a writer.[44] In 2003, Ivo Sanader's government decided to rename all the streets bearing Budak's name. In 2004, a plaque commemorating Budak's birth in the village of Sveti Rok was removed by the same authorities.[45][46][47] In November 2016 in Jasenovac, a plaque with the slogan "Za dom spremni" was unveiled.[48]

Young boy wearing a shirt with a Black Legion, Ustaše Militia sign at the Thompson concert

In the world of popular culture, Croatian singer Marko Perković (known as Thompson) is a symbol of Croatian nationalism and far-right politics.[49][50] It has been widely alleged that he achieved such large attendances with the support of right-wing political organizations who helped rally people to the concerts.[49][51][52] Thompson himself has denied he has anything to do with Nazism numerous times, and called the campaign against him cheap propaganda, saying he was merely a proud Croatian.[49]

Sports

In October 2007, the Croatian newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija reported that NK Imotski's official clothing items featured Ustaša-related symbols (The letter U and the Independent State of Croatia-resembling coat of arms inside the letter. That was, in fact, the logo of the club's leading sponsor, the edile company gUj (meaning "Gojko Und Jure"). Some historians and critics claim the symbols display is an open praising of the Ustaše.[53] The club's president, Nediljko Tolo, said: "As long as the sponsor finances our club, we will carry those symbols on our dresses".[54] In early November 2007, the Croatian Second League Association announced that NK Imotski violated FIFA, Croatian Football Federation rules and laws of the Republic of Croatia. NK Imotski had to end a sponsorship deal with gUj until the company changes its logo. NK Imotski had to find new uniforms for the players and remove all gUj advertisements around the stadium.[55]

In June 2012, the Croatian and German football federations were fined for singing songs associated with Nazism and wearing Nazi symbols.[56] In November 2013, after the FIFA World Cup 2014 Qualification match between Croatia and Iceland, the Croatian defender of Australian descent, Josip Šimunić, reportedly celebrated and motivated the crowd with the Ustashe chant "Za dom, Spremni" upon Croatian qualification to the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Simunic was disciplined by FIFA in December with a ten-match suspension and a fine of CHF 30,000.[57]

Croatian Wikipedia

In the period from 2013 to 2021, the Croatian Wikipedia received attention from international media for promoting a far-right worldview, including anti-LGBT propaganda and bias against Serbs of Croatia by the means of historical denialism and by negating or diluting the severity of crimes committed by the Ustaše regime.[58]

See also

References

  1. Drago Hedl (2005-11-10). "Croatia's Willingness To Tolerate Fascist Legacy Worries Many". BCR Issue 73. IWPR. Archived from the original on 2010-11-16. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
  2. Schäuble, Michaela (2014). Narrating Victimhood: Gender, Religion and the Making of Place in Post-War Croatia. Berghahn Books. p. 323. ISBN 978-1-78238-261-4.
  3. McCormick, Robert B. (2014). Croatia Under Ante Pavelic: America, the Ustase and Croatian Genocide in World War II. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 12. ISBN 978-0-85772-535-6.
  4. Totten, Samuel; Bartrop, Paul Robert; Jacobs, Steven L. (2008). Dictionary of Genocide: M-Z. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 451. ISBN 978-0-31334-644-6.
  5. Ramet, Sabrina P. (2010). Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989. Penn State Press. p. 173. ISBN 978-0-27104-379-1.
  6. Right Radicalism in Party and Political Systems in Present-day European States. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2015. p. 74. ISBN 978-1-44387-938-5.
  7. Mammone, Andrea; Godin, Emmanuel; Jenkins, Brian (2012). Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational. Routledge. p. 144. ISBN 978-0-41550-264-1.
  8. Rosensaft, Menachem Z. (25 June 2020). "Croatia's fascist movement is on the rise yet again". The Independent.
  9. Pavlaković, Vjeran; Pauković, Davor (2019). Framing the Nation and Collective Identities: Political Rituals and Cultural Memory of the Twentieth-Century Traumas in Croatia. Routledge. p. 175. ISBN 978-1-35138-178-9.
  10. "Tuđman je očuh države". Novi list (in Croatian). 2009-12-05. Archived from the original on 2010-03-12. Retrieved 2010-11-30. Spomenuli ste da je taj pokušaj primjene Banovine na rane devedesete bio zastarjeli koncept. No jedan od glavnih koncepata Tuđmana bio je ono što je on nazivao pomirbom svih Hrvata. Jednom zgodom ste izjavili da time on nije pomirio mrtve, ali je zavadio žive. – Potpisao bih tu izjavu i danas. Faktično nije došlo do pomirenja između partizana i ustaša. Nije bilo ni moguće pomiriti te dvije zavađene koncepcije. Kako pomiriti ustaše koji su se vratili iz inozemstva s bivšim udbašima, u krajnjoj liniji, kakve je on mnogo uzeo u svoju službu. Takva koncepcija je bila osuđena da proizvede nove probleme. Njome je antagonizirao mnoge Hrvate.
  11. Renaud de la Brosse (2003-02-04). "Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create a "State for all Serbs" - Consequences of Using the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends - Part 3" (PDF). Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Retrieved 2010-10-28. Whether or not it was true, the video, broadcast twice the same evening, created the desired effect, that is an electric shock in Serbian public opinion which thus saw the confirmation of the intrinsically evil nature of the authorities in Zagreb...
  12. Vukobratovic, Nikola (5 May 2020). "Croatian President's Reluctant Struggle Against Fascist Symbols". Balkan Insight.
  13. "Monument". FilmFreeway. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  14. Dusek, Relja (2017-04-03). "Anti-Fascist Monuments: Croatia's 'Unwanted Heritage'". Balkan Insight. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
  15. "Who stands to benefit from a "reworking" of history? - Gong". gong.hr. 2015-05-15. Retrieved 2023-04-06.
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  17. "Vlast ne radi dovoljno na suzbijanju neoustaštva". Zadarski list (in Croatian). 2008-12-19. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
  18. Davies, Peter; Lynch, Derek (2005). The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right. Routledge. p. 345. ISBN 978-1-13460-952-9.
  19. Goldstein, Ivo (1999). Croatia: A History. McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 225. ISBN 978-0-77352-017-2.
  20. Strickland, Patrick (17 March 2018). "Croatia's 'alt-right': A dangerous group on the margins". Al Jazeera.
  21. The Britannica Guide to Political Science and Social Movements That Changed the Modern World. Britannica Educational Publishing. 2009. p. 233. ISBN 978-1-61530-062-4.
  22. Maldini, Pero; Paukovic, Davor (2016). Croatia and the European Union: Changes and Development. Routledge. p. 130. ISBN 978-1-31715-697-0.
  23. Ristic, Marija; Milekic, Sven; Zivanovic, Maja; Dzidic, Denis (5 May 2017). "Far-Right Balkan Groups Flourish on the Net". Resonant Voices Initiative. Balkan Insight.
  24. Vukobratovic, Nikola (18 June 2020). "Croatian Election Campaign Haunted by Anti-Serb Rhetoric". BalkanInsight. BIRN.
  25. Hopkins, Valerie (3 July 2020). "Croatia's nationalist revival points to role for far-right". The Financial Times.
  26. Orovic, Joe; Kinglsey, Patrick (3 July 2020). "Croatian Prime Minister's Gamble on Early Elections Pays Off". The New York Times.
  27. "Croatian PM hails 'victory' for conservatives in parliamentary vote". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
  28. Hopkins, Valerie (3 July 2020). "Croatia's nationalist revival points to role for far-right". Financial Times. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
  29. "Croatia's ruling conservatives win parliamentary election". Euronews. 4 July 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
  30. Cheles, Ronnie; Cheles, Luciano; Ferguson, Ronnie; Vaughan, Michalina (1995). The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe. Longman. p. 164. ISBN 978-0-58223-881-7.
  31. Lansford, Tom (2019). Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019. CQ Press. p. 1930. ISBN 978-1-54432-711-2.
  32. "Sanader: Nema tog cilja koji može opravdati zločin". Vjesnik (in Croatian). 2004-03-17. Retrieved 2010-11-30. »Osuđujemo i odbacujemo svaki ekstremizam, radikalizam, rasnu, nacionalnu i vjersku mržnju i netoleranciju ma s koje strane dolazile«, rekao je predsjednik Vlade dr. Ivo Sanader odajući počast žrtvama koncentracijskog logora u Jasenovcu. Premijer je u utorak posjetio Spomen-područje Jasenovac u povodu završetka radova na obnovi spomenika Bogdana Bogdanovića »Kameni cvijet«.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link)
  33. Jovan Dragišić (2007-06-20). "Hrvatska mržnja" (in Croatian). Index.hr. Retrieved 2010-12-05.
  34. Milekic, Sven (24 January 2017). "Croatia Ex-President Shown Downplaying WWII Crimes". Balkan Insight. BIRN.
  35. Vladisavljevic, Anja (7 January 2019). "Book Event Questioning WWII Crimes Planned for Zagreb Church". Balkan Insight. BIRN.
  36. Davor Butković (2005-10-15). "Kraj krajnje desnice?". Jutarnji list (in Croatian). Archived from the original on 2011-02-01. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
  37. Radeljić, Branislav; Topić, Martina (2015). Religion in the Post-Yugoslav Context. Lexington Books. p. 67. ISBN 978-1-49852-248-9.
  38. Croatian Parliament (2003-07-11). "Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Kaznenog zakona". NN 2003/111 (in Croatian). Narodne novine. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
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  42. "Sve drame umirovljenoga generala". Vjesnik (in Croatian). Croatian Party of Rights 1861. 2002-09-20. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
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  47. "Preimenovanje Ulice Mile Budaka čeka izbore za mjesne odbore". Večernji list (in Croatian). 2010-03-22. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
  48. Milekic, Sven (5 December 2016). "Fascist Slogan Near Croatia Concentration Camp Sparks Anger". Balkan Insight. BIRN.
  49. Matija Babić (2003-12-28). "Thompson - domoljub ili fašist? Konačan odgovor je..." (in Croatian). Retrieved 2010-12-05.
  50. "Thompson na Maksimiru: Trijumf iz drugog pokušaja" (in Croatian). Index.hr. Retrieved 2010-12-05. Zakon velikih brojeva i male pameti je nalagao da će na ovom koncertu biti i veći broj ustašoljubaca a prolazak maksimirskim travnjakom ispred pozornice i ikonografija viđena kod više desetaka onih koji misle da je tvornica smrti zvana NDH nešto uzvišeno pokazuju da policija na ulazima zakonske odredbe o sprječavanju poticanja i širenja rasne netrpeljivosti i nije shvaćala odveć ozbiljno.
  51. "Wiesenthal Center Urges New York Archdiocese To Disassociate Itself From Concert Of A Croatian Rock Singer Who Celebrates Ethnic Cleansing And Genocide In His Music". October 25, 2007. Retrieved 2012-07-14.
  52. "Američki i kanadski mediji promijenili stav prema Thompsonu" (in Croatian). HINA. November 6, 2007. Retrieved 2012-07-14.
  53. "Imotski nogometaši nose na dresovima ustaško znakovlje". Jutarnji list (in Croatian). 2007-10-28. Archived from the original on 2012-07-29. Retrieved 2010-12-05.
  54. "Imotski nogometaši ustaše za šaku kuna". Slobodna Dalmacija (in Croatian). 2007-10-28. Retrieved 2010-12-05.
  55. "NK Imotski s 'ustaškim' majicama prekršio zakon" (in Croatian). Dnevnik.hr/Nova TV. 2007-11-01. Retrieved 2010-12-05.
  56. "UEFA crack down on Croatia, Germany for racist behavior". dw.com. Deutsche Welle. 19 June 2012.
  57. FIFA.com (2013-12-16). "Croatian player sanctioned for discriminatory behaviour". FIFA.com. Archived from the original on September 23, 2015. Retrieved 2019-04-06.
  58. "Hr.wikipedija pod povećalom zbog falsificiranja hrvatske povijesti" [Croatian Wikipedia under a scrutiny for fabricating Croatian history!] (in Croatian). Novi list. Archived from the original on 16 September 2013. Retrieved 15 September 2013.