Germany-Israel relations

☆ Save On Wikipedia ↗
Germany–Israel relations
Map indicating locations of Germany and Israel

Germany
Israel
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of Germany, Tel AvivEmbassy of Israel, Berlin
Israeli embassy in Berlin, Germany

Germany–Israel relations (German: Deutsch-israelische Beziehungen; Hebrew: יחסי גרמניה-ישראל) are the diplomatic relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel. After the end of World War II and the Holocaust, relations gradually thawed as West Germany offered to pay reparations to Israel in 1952[1] and diplomatic relations were officially established in 1965. Nonetheless, a deep mistrust of the German people remained widespread in Israel and the Jewish diaspora communities worldwide for many years after. Relations between East Germany and Israel never materialised. Today, Israel and Germany maintain a "special relationship" based on shared beliefs and a combination of historical perspectives.[2][3] A central pillar of this relationship is Germany's commitment to Israel's security as part of its Staatsräson (reason of state), a policy that has also sparked domestic and international debate regarding its political and legal implications.[4]

German Embassy, Tel Aviv

Germany is represented in Israel through its embassy in Tel Aviv and honorary consuls in Eilat and Haifa. Israel is represented in Germany through its embassy in Berlin and its Consulate-General in Munich. Both countries are full members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Union for the Mediterranean.

History

Israel, founded in 1948, had no relations with Germany due to the Holocaust and until the reparations agreement with West Germany in 1952. The Israeli passport stated "This passport is valid for all countries except Germany", but this statement was removed after the reparations agreement with West Germany.

Reparations agreement

Konrad Adenauer meeting with Zalman Shazar in Israel

In the early 1950s, the negotiations began between the Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Claims Conference Nahum Goldmann, and the Chancellor of West Germany Konrad Adenauer. Because of the sensitivity of accepting reparations, this decision was intensely debated in the Israeli Knesset. In 1952, the Reparations Agreement was signed. All in all, as of 2007 Germany had paid 25 billion euros in reparations to the Israeli state and individual Israeli Holocaust survivors.[5] This commitment, driven by moral and political responsibility, became central to its Staatsräson— West Germany's post-war national interest.[6] Staatsräson involved addressing historical debts, compensating victims, ensuring Israel's security, and thus restoring Germany's international credibility.[6] There were significant reconciliation efforts, particularly from religious institutions such as the German Coordinating-Council for Christian-Jewish cooperation and the Action Reconciliation Service for Peace.[7]

In 1950, Hermann Maas became the first German to be officially invited to Israel.[8] It took another fifteen years until West Germany and Israel established diplomatic relations on 12 May 1965.[9] Since then, mutual state visits regularly occur, although for many years relations were affected by the fact that Jews both in and outside Israel maintained a deep mistrust of Germany and the German people. German President Roman Herzog's first official visit outside Europe was to Israel in 1994. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was the first foreign leader received in Berlin after the German government's relocation from Bonn in 1999.

Eichmann trial

Adolf Eichmann (inside glass booth) is sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Israel at the conclusion of the trial.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer attempted to influence the trial of Nazi war criminal and Holocaust architect Adolf Eichmann in Israel because he feared that the Nazi past of some senior West German officials, including Hans Globke,[10] would come to light during the trial.[11]

Hans Globke's key position as chief of staff to Adenauer, responsible for matters of national security, made both the West German government and CIA officials wary of exposing his past, despite their full knowledge of it. This led, for instance, to the withholding of Adolf Eichmann's alias from the Israeli government and Nazi hunters in the 1950s.[12][13] The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) had known since 1952 that Eichmann was living in Buenos Aires and working at Mercedes-Benz.[14]

Bilateral cooperation since 2000

Ben-Gurion and Kurt Georg Kiesinger attending funeral of Adenauer in Bonn in 1967

German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder visited Israel in October 2000. In 2005, the year of the 40th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations,[15] German President Horst Köhler and Israel's former President Moshe Katsav exchanged state visits.[16][17] The two countries established a network of contacts between parliamentary, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, as well as strategic and security ties.

On 30 January 2008, Chancellor Angela Merkel's spokesman announced that the German and Israeli cabinets would meet in Israel in March 2008, in honor of Israel's 60th anniversary celebrations. This was the first time the German cabinet met with another cabinet outside of Europe. The joint meeting was expected to become an annual occurrence.[18] On 17 March 2008, Merkel paid a three-day visit to Israel to mark Israel's 60th anniversary. Merkel and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert signed agreements on a range of projects in education, the environment and defense.[19] Merkel spoke of her support for the Jewish state during an unprecedented speech to the Knesset on 18 March 2008.[20]

In January 2011, Merkel visited Israel and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition Kadima leader Tzipi Livni.[21] In February 2011, Netanyahu called Merkel to discuss Germany's vote in the United Nations Security Council in favor of the Palestinian proposal. Merkel reportedly told Netanyahu that he had disappointed her and done nothing to advance peace.[22] To clear the air, Netanyahu was invited for a reconciliation visit to Berlin in mid-March 2011.[22] In September 2011, Merkel criticized Israel for construction in settlements in Jerusalem and said that the new housing permits raised doubts over Israel's readiness to negotiate with the Palestinians.[23]

Germany was one of 14 countries that voted against Palestine's UNESCO membership in October 2011, within the context of the Palestine 194 initiative. When Israel announced that building settlements would continue in response to Palestinian attempts to declare statehood unilaterally, Germany threatened to stop deliveries to Israel of submarines capable of firing nuclear warheads.[24]

Deutsche Bahn, the German national railway, in May 2011 pulled out of the high-speed railway to Jerusalem project because the line will pass in part through the West Bank. According to press reports, the German transport minister Peter Ramsauer told Deutsche Bahn's CEO that the projected rail line was "problematic from a political perspective" and violated international law. As a result, the company, which is owned by the German government, withdrew from the project. The company's decision was seen as a victory for left-wing Israeli and Palestinian activists who had waged a campaign within the context of the international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement.[25]

In May 2019, the Bundestag passed a resolution condemning BDS as antisemitism.[26][27] In March 2022, the newly elected Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, made his first official visit to Israel.[28]

Israel in the Federal German Reason of State

The guiding principle that Israel's security is part of Germany's reason of state (German: Staatsräson; French: raison d'état) developed gradually out of West Germany's policy of remembrance following the Holocaust, the early Federal Republic's policy of reparations, and the special German-Israeli relationship since the 1950s.[29]

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had already justified the rapprochement with Israel by citing Germany's great political and moral obligation toward the Jewish state.[29][30] In his speech to the Bundestag on 27 September 1951, Adenauer spoke of an obligation to provide moral and material compensation to the Jewish people and declared that the Federal Republic was aware of the "immeasurable suffering" that had been caused in the name of the German people.[29][31] The 1952 Luxembourg Reparations Agreement is considered a central starting point for the special German-Israeli relationship. From the very beginning, these relations were shaped by both moral and geopolitical considerations. Adenauer combined moral responsibility with foreign policy pragmatism and the goal of the Federal Republic's international rehabilitation.[29][30][32][33][34] Research shows that West German policy toward Israel since the 1950s cannot be explained solely by the memory of the Holocaust. Frank Stern also described early postwar West German culture as shaped by a political philosemitism that often served, simultaneously, to morally reintegrate Germany into the West.[35]

The term "Staatsräson" was initially used in relation to Israel primarily in diplomatic and foreign policy contexts. In April 2005, the German ambassador to Israel, Rudolf Dreßler, stated that the "secured existence of Israel" was in Germany's national interest and was therefore "part of our reason of state".[36] This guiding principle gained international attention, particularly through Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel officially articulated this in 2006 by describing Israel's right to exist as a German national interest.[37] According to the Israeli ambassador at the time, this statement marked a departure from German neutrality in the Middle East.[38] Merkel reaffirmed this stance later in her speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 and again in her address to the Knesset on 18 March 2008, in which she stated:

"This historic responsibility of Germany is part of my country's raison d'état. This means that, for me as German Chancellor, Israel's security is never negotiable."[39]

Merkel reiterated this position on multiple occasions, including during her farewell visit to Israel in 2021.[40] The guiding principle evolved into a central reference point of German foreign policy toward Israel.[41][42][43][44] It was incorporated into the federal government's 2021 coalition agreement and was supported across party lines by large segments of the political establishment.[45] In light of the ongoing Europeanization of German Middle East policy, an increasing need emerged to align German reason of state with the policies of European partners.[46][47] Even though "Staatsräson" is neither constitutionally nor legally binding, it is widely understood as a non-negotiable guiding principle of the German government, rooted in the memory of the Holocaust and moral responsibility.[48]

Political scientists describe Israel as an integral part of Germany's "ontological security", since the relationship with Israel was closely linked to the Federal Republic's self-image as a liberal, democratic state and its break with its Nazi past.[49] They believe that maintaining the special relationship was essential for German self-identity, especially regarding the alarming rise in antisemitic motivated criminal offenses in Germany since 7 October 2023.[49][50][51] At the same time, German policy toward Israel had been marked by tension: on the one hand, historical responsibility toward Israel lay at the heart of German reason of state; on the other hand, the Federal Republic traditionally invoked universalist principles such as human rights, international law, and a rules-based international order. This tension was particularly evident in German governments' criticism of Israeli settlement construction and Israeli policy in the occupied territories.[49]

Following Hamas's terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, Chancellor Olaf Scholz echoed Merkel's guiding principle and declared on 8 October 2023: "Israel's security is German raison d'état".[52] Unlike Merkel, Scholz refrained from saying it was merely "part" of German national interest.[53]

Since June 2024, the new Nationality Act (§ 10 (1) No. 1a StAG) requires naturalization applicants to make a commitment "to Germany's special historical responsibility for the Nazi regime of injustice and its consequences."[54] Furthermore, Saxony-Anhalt introduced a requirement that prospective German citizens must sign a written declaration in which they recognize Israel's right to exist and condemn any actions directed against this right.[55]

In this context, in 2025, Middle East expert Peter Lintl spoke of an "ontological dissonance" in German policy toward Israel: The invocation of historical responsibility toward Israel was increasingly in conflict with universalist principles such as human rights and international law.[49][56]

Criticism and debate

Critics, including former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, described Merkel's stance as an emotionally understandable, "but foolish view that could have very serious consequences."[57][55] During his visit to Israel in 2012, Federal President Joachim Gauck deliberately avoided using the term Staatsräson and expressed concern that invoking the reason of state entailed obligations that the state may not be able or willing to fulfill.[38]

Germany's stance during the Gaza War starting in 2023 led to increased international and domestic criticism of the concept of reason of state. Political scientists and historians such as Jannis Julien Grimm, Enzo Traverso, and Daniel Marwecki criticised the German government for providing political and diplomatic support for Israel's actions despite possible violations of international humanitarian law, and argue that the concept of reason of state and the memory of the Holocaust were being used to justify support for controversial Israeli policies and to limit critical voices in Germany.[58][59][60] In 2025, Jannis Julien Grimm and Marcus Schneider argued that the German position had contributed significantly to the perception of Western double standards, particularly in the Global South, and had damaged Germany's credibility as an advocate of a "values-based and feminist foreign policy."[61]

In December 2023, South Africa filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Israel for alleged violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.[62] In March 2024, Nicaragua filed a complaint against Germany with the ICJ, accusing it of aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza through arms deliveries to and political support for Israel.[63][64]

At the same time, debates intensified in Germany regarding antisemitism, freedom of speech, and the limits of legitimate criticism of Israel. Critics of German remembrance policy, such as A. Dirk Moses, Jürgen Zimmerer, and Michael Rothberg, argued that since the 2000s, an increasingly dogmatic form of German remembrance culture had emerged, in which support for Israel had become an identity-forming component of German reason of state.[65][66][67][68][69][70] Rothberg describes an increasingly "absolutist" German culture of remembrance that frequently rejected relational or postcolonial perspectives on the Holocaust and the Israel-Palestine conflict.[66][71] Moses referred to this as the "German Catechism", which, among other things, enshrined the singularity and incomparability of the Holocaust and the equation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism.[72][73] According to Moses, anti-antisemitism, the fight against antisemitism, was a central component of this catechism and had evolved into a "philosemitic identification with Israel" as part of German political life.[74] In "The German Chauvinism," Bue Rübner explains that inherited German guilt was being overcome through ritualized expressions of moral righteousness focused on support for Israel, which were increasingly equated with anti-antisemitism.[75] The German-Israeli publicist and director of the Anne Frank Institute, Meron Mendel, has criticized this identification and the invocation of reason of state in connection with the current Israeli leadership, describing it as particularly problematic given the Israeli government's "ultranationalist and religious-fundamentalist" orientation.[34][76] He is also skeptical of Germany's much-discussed inclusion of Israel's security in the concept of reason of state, which, in his view, primarily benefited the German arms industry.[74]

The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) describes the invocation of reason of state as promoting an artificial unquestionability of Israeli policy that undermined democratic discourse.[77] Jannis Julien Grimm believes that the state-centered portrayal of historical responsibility toward Israel reinforced authoritarian tendencies and marginalized emancipatory Jewish perspectives, while distracting from current forms of antisemitism.[58] In this context, reason of state is increasingly viewed as performative. Critics argue that the Federal Republic's fight against antisemitism consisted more of censorship and alignment with state narratives than of meaningful engagement with justice, pluralism, or anti-racism.[75] According to them, this climate enabled punitive measures such as disinvitations, defunding, and denunciations of people and organisations critical of the Israeli government.[75][71] Observers point to a pattern whereby voices that align with German and European notions of nationality are highlighted, to the detriment of more universal and cosmopolitan identities.[75] In a 2025 article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Nimrod Flaschenberg from the organisation "Israelis for Peace" criticized the "blind support for Israel" as part of the "reason of state" on the part of the German government.[78]

In October 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that reason of state did not mean unconditional support for every Israeli government.[79][80] Furthermore, he noted that reason of state "generally applies to one's own country and not to others".[81]

Censorship

Among other things, reason of state has been invoked in connection with the banning of pro-Palestinian protests and organizations critical of the Israeli government.[82] A significant precedent was set in 2019 regarding the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, when the Bundestag passed a non-binding resolution classifying it as antisemitic.[83] Although the resolution is not legally binding, it has been used to justify funding cuts, event cancellations, and the disinvitation of speakers at public institutions.[38][83] These measures have raised concerns regarding civil liberties, academic freedom, and the restriction of democratic space in Germany, particularly when the Bundestag further institutionalized the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism in 2024, which was criticized for equating criticism of Israeli policy with antisemitism.[83][58]

In German education, cultural, and academic policy as well, the invocation of reason of state was subject of controversial debate, and public discourse was restricted.[84] Various educational and cultural programs, including the Jewish-Israeli art collective "The School for Unlearning Zionism", had their funding cut after being labelled as BDS-affiliated.[85] Judith Butler, who received the Adorno Prize in 2012, faced public accusations of anti-Semitism due to her criticism of the Israeli state.[86][87] Another controversy was sparked in 2012 by the poem "What Must Be Said" by the German writer and Nobel Prize laureate Günter Grass. In it, he accuses Israel of endangering world peace and criticizes the "general silence" surrounding this issue in German discourse.[88] As a result, Die Welt described Grass as an "eternal anti-Semite."[89] In 2020, the Federal Government's Commissioner for Anti-Semitism, Felix Klein, criticized the invitation of Achille Mbembe to the 2020 Ruhrtriennale and accused Mbembe of antisemitism due to his comparison of Israel to South Africa's apartheid system.[87]

Numerous public controversies also involved disinvitations, funding cuts, or cancellations of events featuring Israeli, Jewish, or Palestinian intellectuals and artists, including Omri Boehm, Adania Shibli, and Masha Gessen. In December 2023, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the City of Bremen withdrew their support for the awarding of the Hannah Arendt Prize to Gessen after she had criticized Israel's actions in the occupied Gaza Strip and compared them to the Warsaw Ghetto.[87][90][91] In April 2024, the University of Cologne revoked its invitation to Nancy Fraser to serve as a visiting professor after she, too, had criticized the Israeli military's actions in the Gaza Strip and signed the open letter "Philosophy for Palestine" in November 2023.[87][92] In 2025, a lecture by the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, at LMU Munich was cancelled due to anticipated controversy.[93] In 2026, Foreign Minister Johann Wadepuhl called for her resignation as UN Special Rapporteur.[94]

In May 2024, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) examined civil and criminal sanctions as well as the possibility of withdrawing BMBF funding from the signatories of an open letter calling for freedom of expression for "pro-Palestinian" students.[95] In 2024, Anna Younes and Hanna Al-Taher argued that since 7 October 2023, German educational institutions had increasingly become places where the German reason of state regarding Israel was defended through administrative measures, disciplinary actions, and restrictions on pro-Palestinian positions.[96] Jewish and Palestinian students, artists, and scholars describe a climate of fear and self-censorship.[97] New legislation in Berlin proposed expelling students for political expression, further raising concerns about academic freedom in relation to Germany's support for Israel.[98] Civil society organizations and Jewish intellectuals have issued open letters condemning what they describe as disproportionate and politically motivated responses that threaten basic civil rights.[99]

Critics argue that these acts of censorship had restricted legitimate discourse on German-Israeli relations and Israeli policy.[75]

Trade

Israeli Minister of Commerce, Shalom Simhon, meeting with German officials

Germany is Israel's largest trading partner in Europe and Israel's second most important trading partner after the United States. Israeli imports from Germany amount to some USD 2.3 billion annually, while Israel is Germany's fourth largest trading partner in the North Africa/Middle East region.[2]

Germany - Israel trade in millions USD-$[100][101][102][103][104][105][106]
Germany Exports

Israel Imports

 Israel Exports

Germany Imports

 Total Trade Value
2023 6515.8 2137.3 8653.1
2022 7075.7 1880.6 8956.3
2021 6560.4 1792.5 8352.9
2020 5230.2 1681.1 6911.3
2019 5582.7 1671.8 7254.5
2018 5420 1777.2 7197.2
2017 4721.8 1638.4 6360.2
2016 4069.6 1519.9 5589.5
2015 3808.3 1440.8 5249.1
2014 4652 1727.8 6379.8
2013 4667.7 1763.3 6431
2012 4621.8 1631.9 6253.7
2011 4566.5 1950 6516.5
2010 3678.8 1701.4 5380.2
2009 3361.8 1440.3 4802.1
2008 3940.5 1950.6 5891.1
2007 3484.3 1913 5397.3
2006 3201.4 1757.9 4959.3
2005 2986 1345.9 4331.9
2004 3090.2 1361 4451.2
2003 2731.1 1123.3 3854.4
2002 2347.8 1026.5 3374.3

Tourism

Both Germany and Israel offer one another Visa Free or Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA) for their citizens to visit each other and for both the arrivals are considered as predominantly main group of tourist.[107][108] Israel and Germany also offer each other's citizens Working Holiday Visas.[109]

Tourism of Germans in Israel and Israelis in Germany (in thousands)[110][111][112][113]
Origin of Visitors 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
Germany 167.4 151.1 16.5 50.3 289 262.6 218.1 164.1 159.8 162.3 159.8 158.5 171 171.5 139.8 137.4
Israel 234.4 241.7 72.2 45.2 291.2 314 316.1 323.6 311.4 280.6 255 237.8 203.5 187.8 155.1 141.9

Culture, science, and social programs

Joachim Gauck in a visit in Israel with Reuven Rivlin, December 2015
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz with Israeli President Isaac Herzog in Tel Aviv, Israel, 17 October 2023

The two countries enjoy extensive scientific relations, with cooperation in science between Israeli and German universities and the development of the Minerva Society. During the visit by President Katsav, Bundestag President Wolfgang Thierse promoted the establishment of German–Israeli Youth Office – modeled on Germany's joint youth offices with France and Poland – as a tool to educate German and Israeli youth about their respective histories and the sensitivities of their relationship.[2] The German-Israel Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF) was established in 1986.[114]

A number of exchange programs work between young Germans and Israelis. About 2,000 Israelis and 4,500 Germans currently participate each year in the exchange program run by Germany's Federal Ministry for the Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. The German organization Action Reconciliation (Aktion Sühnezeichen) has played a role in bringing Germans and Israelis together. Since 1961, Action Reconciliation has sent about 2,500 volunteers to work in Israeli hospitals and social welfare programs. Churches and trade unions have been active in fostering relations.

Israel places great importance on sister city relationships with German cities. Haifa has five sister cities in Germany; Tel Aviv has five and Netanya has two. Over 100 Israeli cities and local authorities have ties with Germany.[115]

In October 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Germany should boycott the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest if Israel were excluded.[116]

Military cooperation

Germany and Israel have significant and long-standing military cooperation. From 1959 to 1967 the Federal Republic of Germany was a significant supplier of military equipment and arms to Israel.[117] However, after 1965, when West Germany backed out of an agreement to sell tanks to Israel, the United States filled the order by selling 210 M48 Patton tanks. The Merkava 4 uses a German MTU MB 873 Ka-501 air-cooled diesel V12 engine produced under license. Germany has supplied Israel with Dolphin class submarines while Germany utilizes the Israeli-designed Spike Anti-Tank Missile. In 2008, it was revealed that Germany and Israel had been jointly developing a nuclear warning system, dubbed Operation Bluebird, in secret.[118]

The German-Israeli military cooperation was shrouded in secrecy for a long period, as such an entente was not seen favorably within Israel. However, this tight relationship, translated through arms deal and intelligence sharing, developed into solid trust and ultimately laid the necessary groundwork for the establishment of diplomatic ties.[119] For the first time in history, German combat aircraft landed at Ovda Airport in Israel to take part in the Blue Flag exercise in 2017.[120] Israel supplied Arrow 3 missiles to Germany during the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2023.[121]

In October 2023, following the outbreak of the Gaza war, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed full support for Israel. He told Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant that "whatever we can do to support you, with material support, we will do this."[122] In 2023, Germany approved arms exports to Israel worth 326.5 million euros, or about $353.7 million.[123] In 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Mertz told WDR television that he no longer "understands" Israel's purpose in Gaza and that its actions can "no longer be justified by a fight against Hamas."[124] By 8 August the same year, Germany had suspended the export of arms to Israel that could find use in the Gaza Strip, a decision that came after the latter's decision to take over Gaza.[125][126] This was a major shift in Germany's policy towards Israel, given the "special relationship" between the two.[127][128] On 17 November, following the 10 October ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, Meretz spokesman Sebastian Hille announced that these restrictions would be lifted on 24 November, and that exports of arms and military equipment to Israel would resume.[129][130] On 18 December, the Israeli Ministry of Defence announced that the German government approved a $3.1 billion weapons deal with Israel, supplying Germany with Arrow 3 missile defence systems.[131]

In January 2026, Germany and Israel signed an expanded cybersecurity and security cooperation agreement with the goal of strengthening digital defence against cyber threats and enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure.[132] The declaration, signed by German Interior Minister Dobrindt and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, includes plans for joint cyber defence coordination, cooperation on artificial intelligence applications, and enhanced collaboration on counter-terrorism and drone defence.[132][133][134] At the same time, German officials indicated interest in adapting aspects of Israel's cyber defence experience to bolster Germany's national resilience against cyberattacks.[132]

Gaza War

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Israeli President Herzog in Jerusalem, 26 November 2023

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz condemned Hamas' actions during the Gaza war and expressed his support to Israel and its right to self-defense.[135] He criticized the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, saying that "their silence is shameful."[136] On 17 October 2023, Scholz arrived in Israel and on the same day warned Iran and Hezbollah not to get involved in the war between Israel and Hamas. He said that "Germany and Israel are united by the fact that they are democratic constitutional states. Our actions are based on law and order, even in extreme situations."[137]

In January 2024, President Hage Geingob of Namibia called Israel's actions in Gaza "genocidal and gruesome" and sharply criticized Germany's decision to back Israel in South Africa v. Israel, saying that Germany had an "inability to draw lessons from its horrific history".[138] In February 2024 lawyers representing Palestinians in Germany filed a criminal complaint against various senior politicians including Chancellor Olaf Scholz, foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, economic minister Robert Habeck, and finance minister Christian Lindner for "aiding and abetting" the genocide in Gaza.[139] On 1 March 2024, Nicaragua initiated proceedings against Germany at the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, concerning Germany's support for Israel in the Gaza war.[140]

At the start of the Gaza war in October 2023, Germany sold Israel weapons worth 326 million euros, which was not repeated in 2024 according to Israel's Shomrim Research Network. The German spokesman of the Ministry of Economy said that the government makes decisions on arms exports on a case-by-case basis, taking into account humanitarian law and the current situation between Israel and Hamas, the spokesman said.[141] Between August and October 2024, Germany sold weapons worth 94 million euros to Israel.[142] In October 2024, CDU leader Friedrich Merz successfully urged the German government to resume weapons deliveries to Israel, including spare parts for tanks.[143]

In 2024, Amnesty International accused the German government of "taking a one-sided stance in favor of Israel throughout the entire conflict" in the Middle East, claiming that while the German government criticizes Hamas' war crimes, the government does not name Israel's actions that violate international law as such.[144][145]

Francesca Albanese, incumbent UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, criticised foreign minister Annalena Baerbock[146] following a speech by the Foreign Minister in the German Bundestag on 7 October 2024, in which Baerbock alluded to Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilian sites as "self-defense" and said that "that's what Germany stands for" to much applause.[147]

CDU leader Friedrich Merz criticized the International Criminal Court's decision to issue an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes during the Gaza war.[148] In February 2025, one day after the 2025 German federal election, he announced his intention to invite Netanyahu to Germany,[149] "as an open challenge" to the decision of the ICC.[150]

On 8 August 2025, after the Israeli security cabinet's decision to take over the Gaza Strip, Merz announced Germany's decision to suspend the export of arms to Israel that could be used there.[125][126][151] He said that Germany would no longer approve the export to Israel of weapons "that could be used in the Gaza Strip until further notice."[125] In November 2025, the German government ended a partial suspension of arms deliveries to Israel for use in Gaza.[152] In early December 2025, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited Israel and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. The discussions focused on solidifying German support for Israel, the ongoing Gaza conflict, the peace process, and a major arms deal.[153][154]

Public opinion

According to a poll by the German Forsa Institute on behalf of the newspaper Die Welt conducted in December 2023, 45% of respondents in Germany agreed and 43% disagreed with the statement: "Israel's military action in the Gaza Strip is all in all appropriate." In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel, 44% of Germans said Germany has "a special obligation towards Israel." In December 2023, that number dropped to 37%.[155]

According to a 2025 Pew Research Center survey, 31% of people in Germany had a favorable view of Israel, while 64% had an unfavorable view; 21% had confidence in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while 76% did not.[156]

See also

References

  1. "The Reparations Agreement of 1952 and the response in Israel". National Library of Israel. 16 January 2017.
  2. "Israel's foreign relations. The Israel-German special relationship". Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre. 23 November 2005. Archived from the original on 28 September 2007. Retrieved 18 August 2006.
  3. "German Embassy. Background Papers. Germany and Israel". Archived from the original on 27 September 2007.
  4. Deutscher Bundestag (30 November 2023). "Entstehung, Wandel und Entwicklung des Staatsräson-Begriffs in Deutschland (WD 1 - 3000 - 024/23)" (PDF). Wissenschaftliche Dienste (in German).
  5. "Congressional Research Service: Germany's Relations with Israel: Background and Implications for German Middle East Policy, Jan 19, 2007. (page CRS-2)" (PDF).
  6. Wiener, Antje (12 January 2024). "Staatsräson: Empty Signifier or Meaningful Norm?". Verfassungsblog. doi:10.59704/5990f98b96c26ee3. ISSN 2366-7044.
  7. Feldman, Lily (1999). "The Principle and Practice of 'Reconciliation' in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic". International Affairs. 75 (2): 333–356. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00075. JSTOR 2623347.
  8. Yad Vashem: "Hermann Maas" Archived 30 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine
  9. "Beziehungen zu Deutschland (Relations to Germany)". Federal Foreign Office. Retrieved 31 March 2014.
  10. "The senior Nazi who became postwar Germany's top civil servant". The Irish Times. 14 May 2022.
  11. "West Germany's Efforts to Influence the Eichmann Trial". Der Spiegel. 15 April 2011.
  12. Shane, Scott (6 June 2006). "Documents Shed Light on CIA's Use of Ex-Nazis". The New York Times.
  13. Weber, Gaby (4 March 2011). "Die Entführungslegende oder: Wie kam Eichmann nach Jerusalem?". Deutschlandradio.
  14. "Report: German Intelligence Knew Eichmann's Location in 1952". Haaretz. 8 January 2011.
  15. Israel and Germany to mark 40 years of diplomatic relations (Israel MFA) May 2005.
  16. Address by Horst Köhler, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Knesset (Israel MFA) 2 February 2005.
  17. Israeli President Katsav: "Germany is a True Friend of Israel" (German embassy) 2 June 2005.
  18. "AFP: Merkel to visit Israel marking 60th anniversary".{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link)
  19. "Historic agreement for Israel, Germany - CNN.com". Archived from the original on 26 May 2008. Retrieved 17 March 2008.
  20. "Merkel admits Germany's 'Holocaust shame'". CNN. 18 March 2008. Retrieved 11 June 2009. German Chancellor Angela Merkel told Israel of Germany's "Holocaust shame," and asserted its support for the Jewish state during an unprecedented speech to the Knesset on Tuesday.
  21. "Netanyahu Heads to Germany for Reconciliation With Merkel". Haaretz. 6 April 2011. Archived from the original on 10 November 2018.
  22. Barak Ravid and DPA (11 April 2011). "Netanyahu heads to Germany for reconciliation with Merkel". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 7 April 2011. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  23. Barak Ravid (30 September 2011). "Germany reprimands Israel over new Jerusalem construction". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 1 October 2011. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  24. "Germany Threatens To Halt Submarine Sale to Israel". Spiegel Online International. 31 October 2011. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  25. Nir Hasson (11 May 2011). "Deutsche Bahn pulls out of TA-Jerusalem railroad". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 9 July 2014. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  26. Nasr, Joseph; Riham, Alkousaa (17 May 2019). "Germany designates BDS Israel boycott movement as anti-Semitic". Reuters. Retrieved 7 July 2019.
  27. Elia, Nada (20 May 2019). "The reasons behind Germany's condemnation of BDS". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 7 July 2019.
  28. "German Chancellor Olaf Schultz visits Israel for the first time". The Jerusalem Post. 2 March 2022.
  29. Lily Gardner Feldman (2014), Germany's foreign policy of reconciliation: from enmity to amity (1. paperback ed.), Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 133–136, ISBN 978-0-7425-2613-6
  30. Nava Löwenheim (July 2009), "A haunted past: requesting forgiveness for wrongdoing in International Relations", Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 549–551, doi:10.1017/S026021050900864X, ISSN 0260-2105, retrieved 15 May 2026
  31. "Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers in der 165. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestages zur Haltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegenüber den Juden" (in German). 27 September 1951. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  32. Niels Hansen: Zur Politik Konrad Adenauers gegenüber Israel und den Juden: Moral als Staatsräson. Die Politische Meinung 2000, S. 25–33.
  33. Shimon Stein, Mordechay Lewy: Von Einzigartigkeit über Normalität zu Staatsräson: 50 Jahre diplomatische Beziehungen - Essay. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 30 January 2015.
  34. Mendel, Meron. "Israels Sicherheit als deutsche Staatsraison: Was ist das Postulat wert? | Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik". www.blaetter.de. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  35. Frank Stern (1989), "Philosemitism — The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge in West Germany 1945–1952", Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 464–466, doi:10.1093/hgs/4.4.463, ISSN 8756-6583, retrieved 15 May 2026
  36. Dreßler Rudolf (4 April 2005). "Gesicherte Existenz Israels - Teil der deutschen Staatsräson - Essay | Deutschland und Israel" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  37. Busse, Jan (12 January 2024). "Zwischen historischer Verantwortung und Zweistaatenlösung: Die Nahostpolitik der Bundesregierung unter Kanzlerin Merkel" (PDF). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (in German): 58–65.
  38. Michaels, Ralf (2022). "Israels Sicherheit und Existenz: Zwischen Staatsräson und Rechtsstaatsprinzip". Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung (in German). 31 (1). S. Schüler-Springorum: 195–221.
  39. "Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel vor der Knesset am 18. März 2008 in Jerusalem" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  40. "Bundeskanzlerin Merkel in Israel: "Deutschland ist nicht neutral, wenn es um die Fragen der Sicherheit Israels geht"" (in German). 11 October 2021. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  41. Kunze, S. (2016). "Deutschland, Israel und der Nahost-Konflikt". In Glöckner, O.; Schoeps, J. (eds.). Deutschland, die Juden und der Staat Israel: Eine politische Bestandsaufnahme (in German). Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 247–265.
  42. Markus Kaim: Israels Sicherheit als deutsche Staatsräson: Was bedeutet das konkret? bei Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 30 January 2015. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
  43. David Th. Schiller: Anfänge der Rüstungskooperation zwischen Israel und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Zeit vor der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen. In: Milena Uhlmann (Hrsg.): Die deutsch-israelischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen. Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft. Berlin 2008, S. 115–123.
  44. Muriel Asseburg, Jan Busse: Deutschlands Politik gegenüber Israel. In: Thomas Jäger, Alexander Höse, Kai Oppermann (Hrsg.): Deutsche Außenpolitik. Springer Verlag, 2001, S. 693–716 (PDF.)
  45. SPD. (2021). Koalitionsvertrag 2021-2025: Mehr Fortschritt wagen – Bündnis für Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit. Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. (in German). https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf
  46. Patrick Müller: The Europeanization of Germany's Foreign Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Between Adaption to the EU and National Projection. in: Mediterranean Politics, 16 (2011) 3, S. 385–403.
  47. A. Möller: Nahostpolitik der EU. Große Hüttmann, Wehling: Das Europalexikon. 3. Auflage, Bonn 2020, Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH. PDF.
  48. Wissenschaftlicher Dienst (2023): Zum Begriff der Staatsräson im deutschen Recht. Available at: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/984870/79547ce7fca4d17deedd8bf400ee7e44/WD-3-134-23-pdf.pdf
  49. Peter Lintl (12 March 2025), "Ontologische Dissonanz: Die deutsche Überforderung mit dem Israeldiskurs seit dem 07.10.", GWP – Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik, pp. 6–10, ISSN 2196-1654, retrieved 15 May 2026
  50. Kai Oppermann, Mischa Hansel (February 2019), "The ontological security of special relationships: the case of Germany's relations with Israel", European Journal of International Security, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 93, doi:10.1017/eis.2018.18, ISSN 2057-5637, retrieved 15 May 2026
  51. Bundeskriminalamt. 2025. "Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2024." Retrieved 15 May 2026.https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/PMKZahlen2024/PMKZahlen2024.html
  52. "Pressestatement von Bundeskanzler Scholz zur Lage in Israel 8 October 2023 in Berlin" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  53. "Für Deutschlands Staatsräson kann Israel sich nichts kaufen" (in German). 28 October 2023. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  54. "Modernisierung des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts | Bundesregierung" (in German). 27 June 2024. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  55. Antje Wiener (12 January 2024), "Staatsräson: Empty Signifier or Meaningful Norm?", Verfassungsblog, doi:10.59704/5990f98b96c26ee3, ISSN 2366-7044, retrieved 15 May 2026
  56. Heidrun Friese (February 2025), "Institutionalized anti-anti-Semitism in Germany and its aporias", European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 23–27, doi:10.1177/13684310241268312, ISSN 1368-4310, retrieved 15 May 2026
  57. Ronen Steinke (15 November 2023). "Deutsch-israelisches Verhältnis: Das ganz große Wort" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  58. Jannis Julien Grimm (18 April 2024). "On Academic Integrity and Historic Responsibility: Shrinking Spaces for Critical Debate in Germany after October 7". Project on Middle East Political Science. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  59. "Israel und die deutsche Staatsräson - Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung". www.rosalux.de (in German). 12 March 2024. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
  60. "Die Staatsräson gefährdet die demokratische Kultur". JACOBIN Magazin (in German). 13 April 2024. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
  61. Jannis Julien Grimm, Marcus Schneider (1 March 2025), "Staatsräson vs. Weltordnung: Gaza als Feuerprobe wertebasierter Außenpolitik im Globalen Süden", Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 115–119, 128, doi:10.1007/s12399-025-01020-1, ISSN 1866-2196, retrieved 15 May 2026
  62. International Court of Justice (ICJ). 2023. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel): Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures. 29 December 2023. The Hague: ICJ.
  63. International Court of Justice (ICJ). 2024. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). 1 March 2024. The Hague: ICJ.
  64. "Nicaragua files case at World Court against Germany for aiding Israel", Reuters, retrieved 15 May 2026
  65. Moses, D. A. (2021). "The German catechism." New Fascism Syllabus, 1–7. https://newfascismsyllabus.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/The-Catechism-Debate.pdf
  66. Michael Rothberg (December 2022), "Lived multidirectionality: " Historikerstreit 2.0 " and the politics of Holocaust memory", Memory Studies, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 1316–1320, doi:10.1177/17506980221133511, ISSN 1750-6980, retrieved 15 May 2026
  67. Michael Rothberg (13 July 2020), Multidirectional Memory, Stanford University Press, doi:10.1515/9780804783330, ISBN 978-0-8047-8333-0, retrieved 15 May 2026
  68. Jürgen Zimmerer, Michael Rothberg (4 April 2021), "Erinnerungskultur: Enttabuisiert den Vergleich!", Die Zeit, Hamburg, ISSN 0044-2070, retrieved 15 May 2026
  69. Wolfgang Streeck (February 2025), "A matter of state: The politics of German anti-anti-Semitism", European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 40–47, doi:10.1177/13684310241300838, ISSN 1368-4310, retrieved 15 May 2026
  70. Heidrun Friese (February 2025), "Institutionalized anti-anti-Semitism in Germany and its aporias", European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 28, no. 1, p. 24, doi:10.1177/13684310241268312, ISSN 1368-4310, retrieved 15 May 2026
  71. Heidrun Friese (February 2025), "Institutionalized anti-anti-Semitism in Germany and its aporias", European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 28, no. 1, p. 11, doi:10.1177/13684310241268312, ISSN 1368-4310, retrieved 15 May 2026
  72. Moses, D. A. (2021). "The German catechism." New Fascism Syllabus, 3-5. https://newfascismsyllabus.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/The-Catechism-Debate.pdf
  73. Dan Stone (1 January 2004), "The historiography of genocide: beyond 'uniqueness' and ethnic competition", Rethinking History, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 128, doi:10.1080/13642520410001649769, ISSN 1364-2529, retrieved 15 May 2026
  74. Moses, D. A. (2021). "Dialectic of Vergangenheitsbewältigung". New Fascism Syllabus, 90. https://newfascismsyllabus.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/The-Catechism-Debate.pdf
  75. Bue Rübner Hansen (19 March 2024). "The New German Chauvinism- Part I". Lefteast. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  76. Mendel, M. (2023). Über Israel reden: Eine deutsche Debatte (in German). Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 54.
  77. Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). "Deutsche Israel-Politik: Die Unvernunft der Staatsräson" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help)
  78. Nimrod Flaschenberg: To Save Its Democracy and Respect the Holocaust, Germany Must Stop Blindly Backing Israel. In: Haaretz, 15 April 2025; Rachel Fink: "Purely political" — Berlin Orders Deportation of Four pro-Palestinian Activists. In: Haaretz, 4 April 2025.
  79. "Sommer-Pressekonferenz mit Kanzler Merz | Bundesregierung" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  80. Julian Nothen WDR. "Merz kritisiert israelische Angriffe: "Verstehe das Ziel nicht mehr"" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  81. Gabor Halasz. "Deutschland und Israel: Eine Gratwanderung für die Bundesregierung" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  82. Arab Center Washington DC (ACW) (12 March 2026). "Raison d'État, Germany, and the Israeli War on Gaza". Arab Center Washington DC. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  83. "Germany passes controversial antisemitism resolution". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  84. Natasha Roth-Rowland (9 November 2021). "In Germany, universities are leading the charge against Palestine solidarity". +972 Magazine. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  85. Natasha Roth-Rowland (9 November 2021). "In Germany, universities are leading the charge against Palestine solidarity". +972 Magazine. Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  86. DIE ZEIT (1 November 2013), "Frankfurt stellt sich hinter Butler", Die Zeit, Hamburg, ISSN 0044-2070, retrieved 15 May 2026
  87. Heidrun Friese (February 2025), "Institutionalized anti-anti-Semitism in Germany and its aporias", European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 7–8, doi:10.1177/13684310241268312, ISSN 1368-4310, retrieved 15 May 2026
  88. Kai Oppermann, Mischa Hansel (February 2019), "The ontological security of special relationships: the case of Germany's relations with Israel", European Journal of International Security, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 96, doi:10.1017/eis.2018.18, ISSN 2057-5637, retrieved 15 May 2026
  89. "Günter Grass, der ewige Antisemit - WELT" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  90. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. (2023). Hannah-Arendt-Preis an Masha Gessen, Pressemitteilung, 13 December 2023. https://www.boell-bremen.de/sites/default/files/2023-12/pm-hbs-bremen-zur-causa-arendt-preis-13-12.pdf
  91. Masha Gessen (9 December 2023), "In the Shadow of the Holocaust", The New Yorker, ISSN 0028-792X, retrieved 15 May 2026
  92. Absage der Albertus-Magnus-Professur 2024, retrieved 15 May 2026
  93. Bernd Kastner (5 February 2025). "München: LMU verhindert Palästina-Vortrag von UN-Sonderberichterstatterin" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  94. Auswärtiges Amt. "Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz 13.02.2026" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  95. Manuel Biallas und John Goetz NDR. "Fördergeld-Affäre im Bildungsministerium: Weitere Mails aufgetaucht" (in German). Retrieved 15 May 2026.
  96. Anna Younes, Hanna Al-Taher (2 July 2024), "Erasing Palestine in Germany's Educational System: The Racial Frontiers of Liberal Freedom", Middle East Critique, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 397–404, doi:10.1080/19436149.2024.2383444, ISSN 1943-6149, retrieved 15 May 2026
  97. "Germany passes controversial antisemitism resolution – DW – 11/06/2024". dw.com. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
  98. Grimm, J. (18 April 2024). "On Academic Integrity and Historic Responsibility: Shrinking Spaces for Critical Debate in Germany after October 7". Project on Middle East Political Science. Retrieved 15 May 2025.
  99. Hansen, Bue Rübner (19 March 2024). "The New German Chauvinism- Part I". Lefteast. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
  100. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2023". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  101. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2020". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  102. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2017". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  103. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2014". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  104. "סחר החוץ של ישראל לפי ארצות בשנת 2011". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  105. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2008". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  106. "סחר החוץ לפי ארצות בשנת 2005". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 28 November 2024.
  107. 2023 Facts and Figures (PDF) (Report). German National Tourist Board. 2024. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 December 2024.
  108. "Israel: German tourists by purpose of visit 2023".
  109. "Working-Holiday-Visum".
  110. "GENESIS-Online".
  111. 2023 בשנת לישראל מבקרים של כניסות [2023 Visitors to Israel Arrivals] (PDF) (Report) (in Hebrew). Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 2024.
  112. CBS, Tourism 2022 (PDF) (Report). Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 2022.
  113. TOURIST ARRIVALS, BY COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP (PDF) (Report). Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 2015.
  114. "GIF | German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development". www.gif.org.il. Archived from the original on 17 November 2019. Retrieved 7 July 2019.
  115. Gilad, Moshe (6 September 2007). "Choose your family". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 13 April 2008.
  116. "German Chancellor Friedrich Merz threatens to boycott Eurovision Song Contest if Israel is excluded". Euronews. 6 October 2025.
  117. Williamson, Murray, Knox, MacGregor, Bernstein, Alvin H., The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 549
  118. Lappin, Yaakov (17 November 2008). "Israel, Germany develop nuclear warning system". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 18 October 2017. Retrieved 25 October 2017. Working in secret, Israel and Germany have jointly developed a nuclear missile detection system, according to the Defense News Web site.
  119. Serr, Marcel (2015). "Bilateral Arms Cooperation: The Roots of German-Israeli Relations". Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. IX(2). Vol. 9, no. 2. pp. 213–225. doi:10.1080/23739770.2015.1043612.
  120. "India Air Force in Israel for First-ever Joint Military Exercise". Haaretz. 2 November 2017. Archived from the original on 1 November 2017.
  121. Lieber, Michael Amon, Bojan Pancevski and Dov (17 August 2023). "Israel Sells Missiles to Germany as Ukraine War Fuels Demand for Weapons". WSJ. Retrieved 5 September 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  122. "Defence minister pledges Germany's full support to Israel". Reuters. 19 October 2023.
  123. "Germany cancels pro-Palestine event, bars entry to Gaza war witness". Al Jazeera. 12 April 2024.
  124. "Amid calls for arms embargo, who supplies Israel's weapons?". DW. 26 May 2025.
  125. Francis, Ellen; Ríos, Beatriz; Brady, Kate (8 August 2025). "Germany, long opposed to E.U. pressure on Israel, suspends arms shipments". The Washington Post.
  126. "In major shift, Germany suspends arms exports to Israel over Gaza City takeover plan". The Times of Israel. 8 August 2025. ISSN 0040-7909. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  127. Francis, Ellen; Ríos, Beatriz; Brady, Kate (8 August 2025). "Germany, long opposed to E.U. pressure on Israel, suspends arms shipments". The Washington Post. But even if it stops short of a full arms embargo, Friday's decision is a big policy shift for Germany, given its relationship with Israel, which is shaped by historical guilt over the Holocaust.
  128. Cole, Deborah; O'Carroll, Lisa (8 August 2025). "Germany halts export to Israel of arms that could be used in Gaza as global outcry grows". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 9 August 2025. The German chancellor has indicated a significant shift in Berlin's staunch support for Israel by stopping the export of military equipment that could be used in Gaza, as international partners condemned Israeli plans to take control of Gaza City.
  129. "The German government says it's lifting restrictions on exports of military equipment to Israel". AP News. 17 November 2025. Retrieved 22 November 2025.
  130. "Germany lifts military equipment export restrictions on Israel". euronews. 17 November 2025. Retrieved 22 November 2025.
  131. Gjevori, Elis (18 December 2025). "Germany approves $3.1bn Israel arms deal despite Gaza genocide". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 22 December 2025.
  132. Reuters. (14 January 2026). German-Israel deal strengthens cyber defence, German minister says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/german-israel-deal-strengthens-cyber-defence-german-minister-says-2026-01-14/
  133. "Germany turns to Israel for a 'cyber dome' amid rising threats". therecord.media. Retrieved 16 January 2026.
  134. "Germany seeks to learn from Israel, build 'cyberdome' as countries deepen defense cooperation". All Israel News. 13 January 2026. Retrieved 16 January 2026.
  135. "Scholz: Germany has agreed with its partners that Israel has the right to self-defense". MTV Lebanon. 10 October 2023.
  136. "Germany offers Israel military help and promises to crack down at home on support for Hamas". AP News. 12 October 2023.
  137. von der Burchard, Hans (18 October 2023). "Olaf Scholz's plane evacuated on runway following rocket attack in Israel". Politico.
  138. Rust, Jasko (24 January 2024). "Namibia: Germany 'unable to draw lessons from history'". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 4 February 2024. Retrieved 1 April 2024.
  139. Schaer, Cathrin (23 February 2024). "German lawyers sue Scholz, alleging complicity in Gaza 'genocide'". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 24 February 2024.
  140. van den Berg, Stephanie (1 March 2024). "Nicaragua files case at World Court against Germany for aiding Israel". Reuters. Archived from the original on 4 March 2024.
  141. "German government denies it suspended permits for arms exports to Israel". Euronews.
  142. "German arms exports to Israel increase, contradicting government reports". Euronews. 24 October 2024.
  143. "Germany will send more weapons to Israel soon, Scholz says". Reuters. 11 October 2024. Retrieved 16 October 2024.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link)
  144. deutschlandfunk.de (13 October 2024). "Nahost-Konflikt - Amnesty International Deutschland wirft Bundesregierung einseitige Parteinahme vor". Die Nachrichten (in German). Retrieved 13 October 2024.
  145. deutschlandfunk.de (12 October 2024). "Verstößt der Krieg in Gaza und im Libanon gegen das Völkerrecht?". Deutschlandfunk (in German). Retrieved 13 October 2024.
  146. "UN Special Rapporteur denounces German FM's statements on Israel's bombing of Palestinian civilians". Wafa Agency. 16 October 2024.
  147. "Speech by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock during the agreed debate in the German Bundestag on the first anniversary of the terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October". Federal Foreign Office. 10 October 2024.
  148. "Policies of German opposition chief and possible next chancellor Merz". Reuters. 17 September 2024. Archived from the original on 18 September 2024.
  149. "Merz says Netanyahu will be able to visit Germany despite ICC warrant". Al Jazeera. 24 February 2025.
  150. "Merz will offenbar Netanjahu nach Deutschland einladen" [Merz apparently wants to invite Netanyahu to Germany]. tagesschau.de (in German). Archived from the original on 26 February 2025. Retrieved 24 February 2025.
  151. "Germany suspends arms exports to Israel for use in Gaza – DW – 08/08/2025". dw.com. Retrieved 9 August 2025.
  152. "What has Germany's position been on Israel's genocide in Gaza?". Al Jazeera. 7 December 2025.
  153. "Where Germany stands with Israel after chancellor's visit". Deutsche Welle. 7 December 2025.
  154. "Germany's Merz makes first visit to Israel as chancellor amid strained ties". Al Jazeera. 6 December 2025.
  155. Kerez, Timo (21 December 2023). "Nearly 60% of Germans perceive Israel as "foreign": Survey". Anadolu Agency.
  156. Silver, Laura (2 June 2025). "Most in surveyed nations have negative views of Israel". Pew Research Center. Retrieved 2 July 2025.

Further reading

  • Auerbach, Yehudit. "Turning-point decisions: A cognitive-dissonance analysis of conflict reduction in Israel-West German relations." Political Psychology (1986): 533–550. online
  • De Vita, Lorena. Israelpolitik: German–Israeli relations, 1949–69 (Manchester University Press, 2020), online book review
  • Fink, Carole. West Germany and Israel: Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics, and the Cold War, 1965–1974 (2019) online book review
  • Herf, Jeffrey. Undeclared wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German far left, 1967–1989 (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
  • Hirsch, Philipp. "West German foreign policy towards the Arab states, 1967-1979: history of a disappointment" (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2021) online
  • Lavy, George. Germany and Israel: moral debt and national interest (Routledge, 2014) online.
  • Leber, Hubert, and Dona Geyer. "Arms Exports and Holocaust Memory: Saudi Arabia, Leopard Tanks, and Bonn's Secret Israel Clause of 1982." German Yearbook of Contemporary History 6.1 (2022): 199–240. excerpt
  • Lewan, Kenneth M. "How West Germany Helped to Build Israel." Journal of Palestine Studies 4.4 (1975): 41–64.
  • Marwecki, Daniel. Germany and Israel: Whitewashing and Statebuilding (Oxford University Press, 2020) online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2021.1923805.
  • Von Hindenburg, Hannfried. Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965 (Berghahn, 2007) online.
  • Hansen, Bue Rübner (19 March 2024). "The New German Chauvinism- Part I" (Lefteast). online
  • Hansen, Bue Rübner (16 April 2024). "The New German Chauvinism- Part II" (Lefteast). online
  • Kundnani, Hans (2025). Hyper-Zionism: Germany, the Nazi Past and Israel. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-80429-976-0.