Talk:Semiotics/GA1

Spot check

• 9 - Apart from its interdisciplinary applications, pure semiotics... This sentence constructs a distinction between interdisciplinary and pure semiotics, but the distinctions used by Nöth (1990) are Morris's pure/descriptive/applied semiotics or Moles's theoretical/applied semiotics. In addition, Nöth doesn't accept "pure semiotics" as an uncontested term, but the article is using it uncritically. I'm also curious why Morris isn't attributed here—while I think the choice can definitely be justified, both sources choose to attribute the divisions as his invention.

  The point of this sentence is primarily to mention the threefold distinction between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. I dropped the introductory phrase to avoid implying an additional distinction. The section "Core branches" already mentions Morris as the source. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 21 (and 22 since 21 is a footnote) - Both Danesi and Nöth decide to attribute the sense and reference to Frege, which I think the article should follow, especially since it puts the terms connotation/denotation and intension/extension terms in context as concepts that are theoretically separate. Likewise, This distinction is also known by the terms connotation and denotation as well as intension and extension., as it is phrased, is an oversimplification that loses precision, since Nöth writes that to compare them (or treat them as synonymous) is to "neglect many theoretical differences".

  The German terms for the distinction between sense and reference were introduced by Frege, but the distinction is very common today and not limited to discussions of Frege's philosophy. For example, Nöth explains first the distinction itself In this chapter, the term meaning will be used in a very broad sense, covering both of the two more specific dimensions of sense (or content) and reference (object or denotatum). and mentions Frege's role only on a later page. I added a passage to the footnote to explain Frege's role. Nöth lists the other terms as synonyms in his table. He says that the table is a simplification because it ignores relational aspect of meaning, not because the terms do not align with each other. I add a slight reformulation to not imply that everyone treats them as exact synonyms. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 23 - Verified, although I would suggest removing or extensional since both Davis and Nöth give referential as the general category that include extensional/intensional theories as subcategories.

  Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 34 - Verified.
• 40 - (1) For Saussure, the sign is a relation that connects signifier and signified, functioning as a bridge from a sensory form to a concept. The sources do not say this. The sign for Saussure is the unified whole or unity of signifier and signified (i.e. that signifier and signified are constiuent parts of a sign), not the relation between them. As stated by Chandler, the relation between them is given a separate name, signification. (2) As stated by Chandler and Nöth, Saussure excludes reference as a feature of signs. ...does not directly concern the external objects to which signs refer should be replaced with something along the lines of ...does not concern external objects (which is basically Nöth's construction). (3) Focusing on language as a general model of signs... Not sure this phrasing best represents the references. Saussure was a linguist focused on linguistic signs, but as Nöth writes, the application of his sign model on nonlinguistic signs happened after him.

  (1) From Iskanderova 2024 p. 13: The sign, then, serves as the bridge that unites the signifier and the signified into a cohesive and meaningful unit, as depicted in Fig. 3.2. Stated differently, the sign is the relationship between the concept and the representation of that concept. That something is a relation does not mean that it is not a unified whole.

  (2) Slightly reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

  (3) From Nöth 1990 quoting Saussure: signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process, that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master­pattern [patron général] for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system.

• 46 - I'll come back to this, can you clarify what pages were cited in Nöth? I assume its not the entire range between page 42 and page 434.

  It's a typo that is supposed to be 42–44. I fixed it. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 52 - Verified.
• 68 - The second sentence is verified, although the first sentence needs a reference.

  It is discussed at the beginning of the chapter. I added the page numbers. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 85 - This citation is insufficient as it can't verify the claim without being synthesis.

  I think it covers the main phrase about models of communication. I added an additional source to be more explicit about the part on encoding and decoding. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 86.
• 99.
• 100.
• 109.
• 136.
• 137.
• 140 - Verified. I think this sentence would be better off not including ...including their practical functions, historical heritage, and social significance because it derives from one view that was presented among several others. Perhaps this space could be better used describing the other sections in Nöth's chapter on architecture.

  Reformulated to also mention other aspects. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 150 - Verified.
• 170.
• 180 - Verified. Maybe not the best source, but that's outside the scope of GA.
• 193 - The source doesn't discuss whether Wolff focus[ed] on how knowledge depends on sign activity. Otherwise verified.

  I guess it depends on how we interpret the sentence According to Wolff (§§ 292 and 952), "a sign is that entity from which the present, the future, or the past existence of another entity can be recognized." To avoid this difficulty, I focused the discussion of Wolff on the different types of natural signs instead. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:49, 3 June 2026 (UTC)

• 203 - Verified.