Draft:Battle of Namka Chu

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Battle of Namka Chu
Part of Sino-Indian War

Indian prisoners of war escorted by Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers after the Battle of Namka Chu
Date20–25 October 1962
Location
Namka Chu, NEFA, India
27°47′30″N 91°42′43″E / 27.79167°N 91.71194°E / 27.79167; 91.71194
Result Chinese victory[1][2][3]
Belligerents
China India
Commanders and leaders
Yin Fatang John Dalvi (POW)[4]
Units involved
11th Infantry Division 7th Infantry Brigade
Strength
8,000 ~ 3,500[5][6][7]
Casualties and losses
151 killed
344 prisoners		 832 killed
1,065 prisoners

The Battle of Namka Chu[8], which in China is known as Battle of Kejielang was the first battle in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The People's Liberation Army was mainly composed of the Tibet Military Region Front Command and some detachments of the 11th Division of the Army. The Indian Army's 7th Infantry Brigade suffered a devastating blow in this battle and was completely incapacitated. It did not participate in the subsequent operations of this war. The brigade commander, Brigadier General Dalvi, and four battalion commanders with the rank of lieutenant colonel were captured. The PLA then took advantage of the victory and occupied the Tawang area in southern Tibet. The remaining troops of the Indian Army's 4th Corps stationed there had already withdrawn before the People's Liberation Army arrived in Tawang.[9][10]

Background

The main objective of the Chinese side was to drive out all Indian troops stationed near the Kejie Lang River basin and take the opportunity to occupy Tawang. Since the 7th Infantry Brigade was one of the best infantry brigades in the Indian Army at that time, the Chinese side deployed some detachments of the 11th Division of the Army to assist in the operation on the basis of the 419th Tibetan Unit. According to the operation plan, the People's Liberation Army used the 419th Tibetan Unit as the main backbone.[11]

  • The 155th and 157th Regiments each dispatched one battalion to launch a major assault from the left flank of the Indian army, targeting the areas of Kalong and Qiang, with the objective of eliminating the Indian army's defensive forces in these areas.
  • The main force of the 157th Regiment took a flanking maneuver towards the left rear of the Indian army, aiming at the Changdo area. Its mission included attacking the headquarters of the Indian 7th Brigade and its logistics supply facilities.
  • The 154th Regiment launched an attack on the right flank of the Indian Army, with the operational direction being the area between Shaze and Keningnai Bridge[12], and the target being the Indian Army's forces in that direction.
  • The 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment and the garrison detachment of the Shannan Military Sub-district carried out a pincer movement on the front to disperse and fix the Indian troops on the front.
  • In terms of artillery support, the 308th Artillery Regiment has two 120mm mortar companies, which, together with the 11th Division's two 82mm mortar companies, form a light artillery group and are deployed in the Laze and Tala areas to provide fire support for the infantry.
  • The main force of the 32nd Regiment (minus one battalion) was concentrated between Le and Demang, and the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment, located in Cuona, was incorporated as a reserve force and placed under the unified command of that regiment.
  • Air defense cover was provided by the 11th Division's anti-aircraft artillery battalion, deployed along the Mama, Boshankou and Baodingkou lines, with the mission of air defense and ensuring the safety of the rear transport lines.

After the various units formed an encirclement, the plan was to launch a concentric assault to annihilate the Indian army strongholds along the line of Che Dong, Rong Bu Diu, Che Guo Bu, Bang Gang Ding and Se Xiong Lang Gou, and to try to capture the Ha Dong La Pass and Sang Cai La Pass in order to block the Indian army from retreating south or going north to reinforce. The operational objective was to weaken or destroy the overall combat capability of the Indian 7th Brigade.[13]

Battle

The Chinese commanders in this battle were Colonel Chai Hongquan, commander and political commissar of Unit 419 (pictured).
The Indian commander in this battle was Brigadier General John Dalvi, commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade.

Starting at 7:30 a.m. on October 20, the artillery group and artillery units of each regiment launched a 15-minute barrage against the Indian troops in the Kejie Lang area, destroying the Indian artillery positions and some fortifications. At 7:45 a.m., the infantry launched an assault and quickly broke into the Indian positions.[14]

Powerful attack guns and other similar weapons

The Indian Ministry of Defence refers to the location as the left flank position of the 2nd Rajput Battalion at the log bridge, the temporary bridge and the No. 4 bridge.[15]

At dawn on October 20, the 2nd Battalion of the 155th Regiment of the People's Liberation Army launched an engagement and assault: at 5:40, they arrived at the north bank of the Langhe River in Kejie.[16] At 6:30, the main force of the 6th Company concealed themselves and waded across the river west of the bridge on the northwest side of the second stronghold. Subsequently, the main force of the 2nd Battalion (the 4th, 5th and 8th Companies) crossed the river after a rapid fire attack and quickly deployed along the east side of Qiangdeng. Within about 14 minutes, they had basically completed the encirclement of the Indian army. After about 3 hours of fighting, the battalion reported that it had annihilated two Indian infantry companies with a total of 270 men (228 killed and 42 captured) in the Qiangdeng direction, captured 112 bunkers, and suffered 21 dead and 34 wounded.[17][18]

In the direction of Karon, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment carried out flanking attacks and infiltration and division with the support of artillery. The goal was to first annihilate the Karon defenders and then advance towards Che Dong and Rong Bu Diu. The battalion claimed to have annihilated three companies and one battalion headquarters of the Indian army in Karon, Che Dong and Rong Bu Diu within half a day, and captured Lieutenant Colonel MS Rikh, the battalion commander of the 2nd Rajput Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel BN Tewari, the communications regiment commander of the 4th Division.[19] However, despite this, due to the long-term construction of the Indian army's positions and the tight fire support, the 1st Battalion could only attack fort by fort. The casualties in the attack operation were 59 dead and 79 wounded.[19][18]

Capture of Dhola Post

During the capture of Dhola Post, soldiers of the Indian 2nd Assam Infantry Battalion surrendered to soldiers of the PLA 154th Infantry Regiment

The Indian Army defended it with one reinforced company and one reinforced platoon. The fortifications were mainly made of earth and wood and stone and wood, with a total of more than 100 bunkers of various sizes.[20]

On October 20, the 3rd Battalion of the 154th Regiment of the People's Liberation Army, with the cooperation of some troops of the Demang Border Defense Force, launched an attack in two echelons: the 9th Company attacked the first bunker group from west to east and advanced into the depth of Shaze; the 7th Company made infiltration and outflanking maneuvers, broke through the southwest side of Shaze and went straight to Zhongkun Bridge; the 8th Company was the second echelon.[21] At the same time, the regiment ordered the 5th and 6th Companies of the 2nd Battalion to occupy the high ground above the cliff on the west side of Chideng, Niangba and Zhongkun Bridge, and block the bridge with firepower to cooperate with the 3rd Battalion in the operation. In terms of artillery support, the regiment used 21 82 mortars, 3 75 recoilless guns, and attached two 120 mortars of the 11th Division to form an artillery group; the detachments of the 3rd Battalion occupied the starting position one after another from 2:00 to 4:00.[22]

At 11:40, the 8th Company annihilated the garrison of the third bunker group in Dhola Post and was awarded a collective third-class merit after the battle. A total of 162 Indian soldiers were killed in the Dhola Post battle (13 of whom were killed by the Demang Border Guard), and 14 light machine guns, 94 guns of various types (11 of which were captured by the Demang Border Guard), 2 81mm mortars, 2 51mm mortars, 3 90mm rocket launchers, and a number of equipment such as radios, walkie-talkies, telephones, and binoculars were captured. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 154th Regiment (minus the 3rd Company) advanced to Keningnai and approached the Keningnai Bridge, but due to slow movement, it was unable to launch an attack quickly. It was not until 20:00 that the Indian army had withdrawn that the bridge was occupied. The opportunity was missed and no casualties were achieved.[23]

Circuitous chapters

According to the deployment of the Tibet Military Region Forward Command and the 419th Tibetan Army, Li Derong, the commander of the 157th Regiment, decided to use the 1st Battalion and command the 8th Company to carry out a flanking maneuver against Zhangduo. The 1st Battalion chose to cross the dense forest from the left side of the Indian army based on the enemy situation and terrain. First, it seized a high ground of about 4,300 meters above sea level to cut off the retreat route. Then, it suppressed the enemy from the high ground and launched an attack on Zhangduo. After completing the annihilation, it took advantage of the situation to close the Sangcai Pass and block the Indian army that was fleeing south and coming to the aid of the north. Heavy machine guns and 57mm recoilless guns were distributed to each company to strengthen the firepower.[24]

After capturing Zhangduo, the 157th Regiment immediately searched and annihilated the remaining enemy in the surrounding area. The battle ended at 19:00 on the 20th. It is said that the operation annihilated the headquarters and two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Gurkha Regiment, and destroyed the rear of the 7th Brigade and a part of the artillery and service units; killed 68 people including Major Ram Singh, deputy commander of the 4th Division Communications Regiment, captured 492 people including Lieutenant Colonel Aruwaliya, battalion commander, and seized 14 artillery pieces, 4 rocket launchers, 19 light and heavy machine guns, 180 long and short guns, 14 radios and other supplies.[25]

On the morning of the 21st, the 155th Regiment, the 157th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment carried out mopping-up operations in the forests south of the Kejie Lang River, the Sexionglang Gully, and the outskirts of Zhangduo, and took control of Sangcaila, Gabola, and Jishankou. Thus, the counter-offensive in the Kejie Lang area came to an end. According to the statistics of the Chinese side, the Indian Army annihilated the headquarters of the 7th Brigade (Brigade Commander Dalvi escaped and was captured), the 2nd Rajput Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 9th Gurkha Regiment, and also annihilated most of the 9th Battalion of the Punjab Regiment, the 5th Battalion of the Assam Infantry and a part of the 4th Battalion of the Guards Regiment; killed more than 770 people including Major Ram Singh, deputy commander of the 4th Division Communications Regiment, and captured Lieutenant Colonel Tawari, commander of the 4th Division Communications Regiment[26], Lieutenant Colonel Rick, commander of the 2nd Rajput Battalion[26], Lieutenant Colonel Harbhajan Singh Ahluwalia, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Gurkha Regiment[27], and Lieutenant Colonel Rattan Singh , commander of the 5th Battalion of the Assam Infantry and more than 970 people.[28]

Capture of Longbu and Zemithang

Mi-4 helicopter captured by the People's Liberation Army

According to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the Tibet Military Region Forward Command ordered the "Tibet 419 Unit" to launch a four-pronged attack on the Qiusanmou, Zemithang and Yongbangqiao line from 18:00 on the 21st at 16:55 on the same day to expand the results of the battle.[29] After receiving the order, the troops launched a maneuver: the 157th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 155th Regiment set off from Sangcaila, the 154th Regiment advanced from Hadongla, and the Forward Command led the main force of the 155th Regiment to follow the 154th Regiment and pursue them towards Longbu. At the same time, a company of the 1st Regiment of the Shannan Military Sub-district moved from the east bank of the Nyangmu River through the Shaliu Pass towards Zemithang and Jialingding. Intimidated by the victory of the Kejie Lang Campaign, the tactical command of the Indian Army 4th Division ordered the destruction of documents and the retreat to Tawang on the 21st. At noon on the 22nd, the “Tibet 419 Unit” successively occupied Longbu and Longbupu, annihilated a part of the scattered enemy, and captured a Soviet-made Mi-4 helicopter. A company of the First Regiment of the Shannan Military Sub-district occupied Zemithang.[30]

John Dalvi captured

According to Chinese war history records, during the pursuit of the 419th Tibetan Army unit to the south, the 154th Regiment set off from Hadongla in the early morning of the 22nd and advanced towards Longbu. The 2nd Company of 82mm mortars of the regiment (65 people, carrying 6 mortars, with each person carrying more than 35 kg) was organized into a combat formation and followed the infantry closely, with no personnel falling behind. At about 9 o'clock, the company reached the vicinity of Longbupu. Deputy Company Commander Peng Junxian discovered Indian troops active in the woods beside the road. He then used the dozen or so rifles and submachine guns that the company was equipped with to maneuver, inserting from the side and rear and forcing Brigadier General John Dalvi, the commander of the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, and Captain Talwar and 9 others to surrender. They captured 1 machine gun and 8 rifles.[31][32]

Battle of Bum La Pass

The Bang Pass area is occupied by a company of the 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment and two platoons of the 5th Battalion of the Assam Infantry. The Bang Pass stronghold is defended by two platoons of the 5th Battalion, which have built various earth and wood and stone fortifications, guarding the gate to Tawang. About 500 meters south of Bang Pass, there is a company of the 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, which can support the battle at Bang Pass at any time. The headquarters of the 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, along with a company, a heavy machine gun platoon, and mortar and mountain artillery detachments, are stationed in Lagula and the surrounding area.[33][34] The 2nd and 3rd companies of the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Shannan Military Sub -district and the artillery company cooperated with some border defense detachments to annihilate the Indian troops near Bum La Pass. Among them, the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Companies were responsible for attacking the Bang Pass stronghold. At 7:00 on the 23rd, the attacking detachments launched an attack on the Indian troops at Bang Pass with the support of artillery and machine gun fire, and quickly annihilated two Indian platoons.[33]

Some Indian sources claim that the Indian Army believed that the entire 11th Division of the People's Liberation Army participated in the attack on Bang Pass, and that two platoons of the Sikh Regiment and the Assam Regiment were able to "temporarily resist" the attack of the People's Liberation Army's "33rd Infantry Regiment" and kill "at least 200 people".[35]

Capture of Tawang

The General Staff of the People's Liberation Army issued an order at 23:00 on October 22 to "occupy Tawang at the opportune moment". Accordingly, the Tibet Military Region Forward Command issued an "Operational Order to Attack and Annihilate the Indian Army in the Tawang Area" at 10:00 on the 23rd, determined to concentrate the forces of the 419th Tibetan Army, two regiments of the 11th Division, and four companies of the Shannan Military Sub-district, totaling five regiments and one battalion, to pursue the victory and take Tawang directly to annihilate the Indian Army in the Tawang area. The Indian Army withdrew south without a fight, and the various units under the Tibet Military Region Forward Command occupied Dongxinqiao and Tawang on the 24th and 25th respectively, and annihilated the rear part of the Indian Army.[36]

At the same time, the Chinese side also won the battle in the western section of the Line of Actual Control . On October 24, the Chinese government issued a statement and put forward three suggestions for the peaceful resolution of the border issue. On the same day, the General Staff ordered the Tibetan border troops to stop the pursuit and not to cross the Tawang River for the time being. The Tibetan border troops then assembled in the area north of the Tawang River and rested and awaited orders. Thus, the Chinese side declared the first phase of the counterattack operation on the eastern front of the Sino-Indian border a victory.[37]

Legacy

The Battle of Namka Chu ended in a complete victory for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which was able to control the battlefield situation and capture several Indian middle and high-ranking officers. Tawang is an important political and religious center of Tibetan Buddhism in southern Tibet and the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso. It has important political and cultural significance. In addition, Tawang has high ground to the north that is easy to defend, and it has a commanding position over the Tawang River Valley to the south. Its military position is also very important. Therefore, the occupation of this place was regarded by the Chinese as one of the main achievements of this battle.[38]

The counterattack operations in Kejie Lang and Tawang areas (excluding Shannan, Linzhi and Changdu areas) resulted in the annihilation of 1,897 Indian troops (832 killed and 1,065 captured, including Brigadier General Dalvi, the commander of the 7th Brigade). The Chinese People's Liberation Army captured 75 artillery pieces, 122 machine guns, 1,104 guns, 3 helicopters, 11 vehicles, 4 bulldozers, 74 radios, 30 walkie-talkies, 5 switchboards, 41 single machines and other military supplies. The Chinese People's Liberation Army suffered 151 deaths (16 officers and 135 soldiers) and 334 wounded (30 officers and 304 soldiers.[38]

In this battle, the People's Liberation Army used the Type 56 rifle family (Type 56 semi-automatic rifle, Type 56 submachine gun, and Type 56 squad automatic weapon) produced under Soviet authorization. Against India, which was only equipped with Lee-Enfield rifles, Sten submachine guns, and Bren light machine guns, the People's Liberation Army demonstrated a higher efficiency in individual firepower output, making it easier for them to gain an advantage in close combat.[39] The People's Liberation Army infantry squads used this weapon configuration until it was replaced by the Type 81 rifle family in the Battle of the Two Mountains. The claim of light weapons firepower suppression was confirmed by the war history written by the Indian Ministry of Defence:

Indian troops lacked suitable automatic and semi-automatic weapons in combat. Worse still, there was a shortage of every type of weapon, and ammunition stockpiles were often far below required levels. They also lacked proper winter clothing and boots. However, even considering the safety of the retreat, this cannot justify the Indian army's rout after engaging the enemy in the Karmen area. Following the battle of Nankachu and the retreat from Tawang, a defeatist atmosphere permeated the officers and soldiers of the Northeast Frontier Special Region. It became almost a rule that Indian troops would immediately retreat whenever, wherever, or which unit was threatened or attacked by Chinese forces.

Thanks to the plateau firing tables specially compiled for artillery firing in plateau areas[40], the Chinese People's Liberation Army achieved more accurate fire strikes in this battle, despite being at a disadvantage in both the quantity and quality of artillery. In contrast, the superior artillery of the Indian Army played a negligible role in this battle.[41]

India

In any case, the Indian 7th Infantry Brigade suffered a devastating blow in this battle and lost all operational capability. It did not participate in subsequent operations and was eventually disbanded after the Sino-Indian War ended. Dalvi was detained by the Chinese for nearly seven months and was released by China in May 1963. He returned to Kolkata by plane on May 22.[42] According to the testimony of the Fourth Corps Commander Kaul, the Indian Ministry of Defence's war history attributes the main responsibility for this defeat to Brigadier General Dalvi.[43]

Furthermore, the 7th Brigade's mission changed on October 12th; it was then only required to hold the line, not advance and repel the Chinese. This significant change appears not to have prompted any redeployment or reorganization of the frontline troops at Nankachu to establish a defensive posture. This represents a command failure at the field level. Therefore, Brigadier General Dalvi's statement that "no strategic plan or arrangement enabled the 7th Infantry Brigade to gain depth or establish blocking positions to cover the retreat of the Nankachu defenders" seems almost entirely to be a self-accusation.

In his book written in 2003, Dalvi refuted this claim, stating that it was a complete distortion of the truth. He said that as early as October 19, Dalvi had requested his superiors to approve the withdrawal of the company from Zhangle/Sezhanghu to fill the front line, but the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Corps did not approve it.[44] This claim was also confirmed in the war history written by the Indian Ministry of Defence itself.[45]

See also

References

  1. India, Mission Victory (2020-07-05). "Lest We Forget: The Life and Times of my Father Brig. John Dalvi". Mission Victory India. Archived from the original on 2022-05-12. Retrieved 2026-05-12.
  2. Fisher & Rose 1962, p. 27–37.
  3. Ryan, Finkelstein & McDevitt 2003, p. 184–187.
  4. Wang 2022.
  5. Sinha 1992, p. 42–45.
  6. Sinha 1992, p. 35–37.
  7. Sinha 1992, p. 55.
  8. "Battle of Namka Chu, 10 October 1962 – Indian Army". Retrieved 2026-05-12.
  9. Sinha 1992, p. 51.
  10. Tewari, Maj Gen KK (2015-09-05). "The Battle of Tawang". indiandefencereview.com. Retrieved 2026-05-12.
  11. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 154–155.
  12. Sinha 1992, p. 39.
  13. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 155.
  14. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 156.
  15. Sinha 1992, p. 31.
  16. Fisher & Rose 1962, p. 27–28.
  17. "Battle of Namka Chu, 10 Oct - 16 Nov 1962". www.bharat-rakshak.com. Archived from the original on 2002-08-10. Retrieved 2026-05-12.
  18. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 157.
  19. Sinha 1992, p. 32.
  20. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 162.
  21. Fisher & Rose 1962, p. 29–30.
  22. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 163.
  23. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 164.
  24. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 165.
  25. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 166.
  26. Sinha 1992, p. 27.
  27. Sinha 1992, p. 28.
  28. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 167.
  29. Sinha 1992, p. 14.
  30. Sinha 1992, p. 42–43.
  31. "Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch)" (PDF). egazette.nic.in. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2022-01-26. Retrieved 2026-05-12.
  32. Fisher & Rose 1962, p. 35.
  33. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 171.
  34. Sinha 1992, p. 37–38.
  35. Sinha 1992, p. 36.
  36. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 172.
  37. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 173.
  38. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 172–173.
  39. Van Tonder 2018, p. 63.
  40. Academy of Military Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China 1993, p. 106.
  41. Ryan, Finkelstein & McDevitt 2003, p. 187.
  42. Dalvi 2003, p. 496–497.
  43. Sinha 1992, p. 35.
  44. Dalvi 2003, p. 361.
  45. Sinha 1992, p. 19.

Bibliography

  • Sinha, P.B.; Athale, A.A.; Prasad, S.N., eds. (1992). "Chapter IV: Invasion of NEFA – Fall of Tawang". History of the Conflict with China, 1962. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, India. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2023-07-08. Retrieved 2023-07-06.
  • Dalvi, John P. (2003). Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster. Delhi: Natraj Publishers. ISBN 978-8181581457.
  • Van Tonder, Gerry (2018). Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962. London: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 9781526728388.